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We know facts in a variety of ways. For example, one may know a fact perceptually or by                  
mere testimony. Compare an instance of ​perceptual knowledge — e.g., the knowledge that             
one acquires when one sees that there is a table in front of oneself — to an instance of                   
non-perceptual knowledge with the same content — e.g., the knowledge that one acquires             
by mere testimony when one am told that there is a table in front of one. It is natural to                    
distinguish between these two types of knowledge in terms of ​the modes of presentation              
under which they represent the state of affairs that there is a table in front of me. In the                   
former case (when one sees the table), one knows that there is a table in front of oneself                  
under a visual mode of presentation, whereas in the latter case (when one is merely told                
that there is a table), one comes to know that proposition under a non-visual mode of                
presentation. 
According to a prominent view of know-how — known as ​intellectualism about            
know-how — knowing how to perform a task is a matter of being in a propositional                
knowledge state about how to perform the task under a ​distinctive mode of presentation.              
The relevant mode of presentation is neither testimonial nor merely perceptual. Rather, it is              
distinctively practical. Knowing how to perform a task, and being skilled at performing a              
task, such as swimming, is a matter of knowing facts about how to perform a task under a                  
practical representation of that task. As I understand it, the view is motivated by a variety                
of considerations coming from action theory and cognitive sciences that strongly suggest            
that the intentionality and intelligence of our actions is to be explained in terms of               
propositional knowledge about the means to achieve certain goals.   2
This chapter will not rehearse those motivations here. Rather, it will focus on the              
question: what does it mean to represent a task under a practical mode of presentation? The                
chief challenge for proponents of intellectualism is to spell out in clear and independently              
motivated terms what it means to represent something practically. This chapter discusses            
recent attempts to clarify the notion of practical representation and its theoretical            
fruitfulness. The ultimate goal is not just to show that intellectualists are on good grounds               
when they appeal to practical representation in their theories of know-how. Rather, it is to               
1 ​I am particularly grateful for discussion to Todd Ganson, Gabe Greenberg, and John Krakauer.  
2See e.g., Pavese (2013, 2018, 2020a). For the role of propositional knowledge in skillful action, see also Stanley & 
Krakauer (2013), Christensen & Al. (2019), Wu (2020).  
 
 argue that ​any plausible theory of skill and know-how has to appeal to the notion of                
practical representation developed here. 
§1 explains the notion of a mode of presentation and introduces practical modes of              
presentation. §2 illustrates practical representation by discussing models of motor control           
in current theories of sensori-motor psychology; §3 puts forward an argument for positing             
practical representation. §4 goes from practical non-conceptual representations to practical          
conceptual representations ​— ​to practical concepts. §5 concludes. 
 
1. What is a mode of presentation? 
We are accustomed to the idea that the same individual might be represented under              
different ​conceptual modes of presentation. For example, one might think of Venus ​as the              
morning star​; one might think of Venus ​as the evening star​. In this case, the different                
modes of presentation specified by the “think of ​x as ​y​” locution correspond to different               
concepts that one possesses and under which one might group individuals. Had one             
grouped Venus under yet different concepts, one would be in a position to think of it under                 
yet different conceptual modes of presentation. 
Many authors also argue for the existence of ​perceptual (and nonconceptual) modes            
of presentation (Evans 1982; Peacocke 1992, 2001; Block 1990; Bermudez 1995; Burge            
2010; Neander 2017; Lande 2018). ​Block (1990) argues that inverted spectrum subjects            
with phenomenally distinct color experiences in different environments might represent the           
same external colors. ​Peacocke (1992:73–78) argues that perceptual representations can          
stand in many-to-one relations to their content, as in the Mach diamond’s case, where a               
square is perceived as a diamond instead of as a square. Burge (2010) mounts a sustained                
argument ​for perceptual modes of presentation starting from the phenomenon of           
perceptual constancy​. In perceptual constancy of, say, a rectangular object, the           
representation of its rectangularity from different angles happens ​via an egocentrically           
anchored spatial coordinate system due to the spatial layout of light registration by retinal              
receptors. Differences in the spatial format of sensory cues and processing ​can ​determine             
differences in our abilities to perceive a given attribute, such as the rectangularity of an               
object, by affecting our accuracy and precision of representation. This is because how we              
represent is a function of our representational abilities which are determined by the             
differences in sensory cues and processing. Therefore, differences in representational          
abilities determine differences in modes of presentation – e.g., ​rectangular at specific tilt             
Tn and rectangular at specific tilt Tm ​may therefore represent the very same attribute (e.g.               
rectangularity​).  
Representations might be classified by their distinctive modes of presentation. Say           
 
 that a representation is ​conceptual if it represents what it does ​via a conceptual mode of                
presentation; and ​perceptual if it represents what it does ​via a perceptual mode of              
presentation. The nature of the relevant perspective depends on the relevant           
representational abilities​. In the conceptual case, the different ways in which we might             
conceptually represent the world depend on the ​basic conceptual abilities that we possess             
— i.e., the most basic abilities for thinking and reasoning (​Rosch 1978; Jackendoff 1989;              
Laurence & Margolis 1999; ​Prinz 2004: Chapter 1; ​Machery 2009: 7–51; ​Margolis &             
Laurence 2014​). Perceptual modes of presentation, on the other hand, depend on basic             
representational abilities that do not need to be conceptual. For example, consider the             
ability of the visual system to locate objects in two-dimensional space relative to a              
viewpoint. This ability to locate objects in two-dimensional space is not a conceptual             
ability — it is not an ability to think and to reason. Rather, it is a ​tracking ability because it                    
is an ability to vary states which are two-dimensionally structured in accordance with the              
varying of objects and their features in three-dimensional space (Dretske 1986, 1988;            
Stalnaker 1999:347; Neander 2017:152–3). The auditory system and the touch system’s           3
ways of tracking features in the environment do not need to be of the same kind as the                  
visual system’s ability to locate objects in two-dimensional space​. Their modes of            
presentation are correspondingly different. If we have had yet different tracking abilities,            
such as bats’ echolocation, we would perceptually represent the world under still different             
modes of presentation.  
This discussion puts us in a position to introduce ​in abstracto the notion of ​practical               
representation​. Suppose our minds could represent the world or some aspect thereof, in a              
way that is a function ​not (or not just) of our conceptual abilities, and not even (or not just)                   
of our perceptual abilities, but rather of abilities that are neither (merely) perceptual nor              
(merely) conceptual and instead are practical, in some sense to be made precise. By              
representing (some aspect of) the world in a way that is function of their practical abilities,                
there would be a good sense in which our mind could represent things ​via a practical mode                 
of presentation. Different minds, or the same mind at different times, might even differ in               4
their practical abilities and henceforth in how they practically represent the world. A             
representation is practical if it represents what it does ​via a practical mode of presentation,               
and it represents via a practical mode of presentation if it represents as a function of the                 
3 Not everybody thinks of perception in terms of tracking. Cf. Lupyan and Clark (2015) defend a view of perception 
as a ​predictive process​.  
4 As this informal gloss gives out, the notion of practical representation introduced in this essay is very different                   
from Nanay’s (2014) notion of “pragmatic representation” (cf. Pavese 2019:801​–​3 for extended comparison). For a               
different notion of practical modes of presentation, one according to which practically representing something is a                
matter of representing it in terms of one’s practical interests, see ​Weiskopf ​(2018).   
 
 representor’s most basic practical abilities.  
This section has provided an initial abstract characterization of practical          
representation. Section 3 discusses in some detail an example of practical representation,            
posited by ​sensori-motor psychology​.  
 
2. Sensori-Motor Psychology and​ ​The Casio Metaphor 
Suppose I form the intention to grasp a bottle of wine within my visual field. How does                 
that intention translate into the corresponding intentional movement of grasping the bottle? 
According to the most recent psychological theories of motor control (e.g., ​Schmidt            
2003; Jeannerod 1997:11-55, 2006; ​Arbib 1985; Wolpert 1997; Wolpert & Kawato 1998),            
building on the insights of Helmholtz (1867) and Bernstein (1923, 1930, 1967), the motor              
system translates that intention into a ​motor command​, prescribing to one’s muscles and             
nerves the relevant movement. ​Contemporary ​sensori-motor psychology studies how this          
translation happens. ​Figure #1 illustrates one prominent model of motor control, due to             5
Wolpert (1997).  
 
 
 
Figure #1:​ ​The Motor System ​(cf. Wolpert 1997) 
 
According to this model, the agent’s intention is an input to the motor planner              
which uses sensory stimulations, including stimulations of the retina, the inner ear, muscle             
spindles and so on, to make an estimate of the environmental conditions, of the location of                
5 See Rescorla (2016) for a helpful review of this literature.  
 
 the goal and the relative location of the limbs. Based on these estimates, the motor planner                
issues a ​motor command to execute the intended task. On this model, the translation from               
intention to a motor command involves various sorts of representations — some merely             
perceptual, some more distinctively motoric. Among the motoric representations, there are           
motor schemas, which I will return to later. Now, I’d like to start focusing on the outputs                 
of this model — i.e.,  on the motor commands. How are we to think of them?  
To answer this question, it is helpful to compare the motor system to a Casio               
electronic keyboard (​Figure #2​):  
 
 
                     ​                  ​Figure #2:​ A Casio Keyboard 
 
In such a keyboard, ​pressing each white and black piano-style key activates the switches,              
which triggers the electronic sensors to generate a sound ​— i.e., a musical note (​Figure               
#3​). 
 
 
 
Figure #3:​ key=elementary command 
 
So, each key is a ​command ​that, when executed, generates a note. Because each key is a                 
command that is not made out of other commands, it is structurally simple or primitive. Let                
us call it an ​elementary command​. A sequence or a configuration of keys is a               
non-elementary command​ (​Figure #4​). 
 
 
 
 Figure #4:​ A Configuration of keys on the keyboard = a non-elementary command 
 
Compare playing on the keyboard to executing a motor task ​— e.g., the task of grasping a                 
bottle within one’s visual field. And compare the music produced by means of the              
keyboard to the motor task executed ​— to having grasped the bottle. 
 
 
 
Figure #5: ​The Matrix 
 
The comparison runs deeper: the matrix circuits are neural paths from motor cortex to              
spinal cord; the wires to the speakers are the spinal cord; the speakers themselves are the                
efferent nerves and muscles.  
Typically, a motor command issued by the motor system will be a ​sequence of              
instructions, like complex configurations of keys on the keyboard. This realization goes            
back to Lashley (1951). He noted that fast movements such as those required, for example,               
for playing the piano are performed too quickly to rely on feedback about one movement               
shaping the next movement. The time required to receive feedback about the first             
movement, combined with the time needed to develop a plan for the subsequent             
movement and send a corresponding message to muscles, was simply too long to permit              
piano playing. Movements are performed as motor sequences, with one sequence being            
ready, while another ongoing sequence was being completed. Hence motor commands           
issued by the motor system will typically be ​complex instructions​, like complex            
configurations on the keyboard. 
Now, different motor systems might prescribe the same motor task in different            
ways, depending on the primitive abilities of the system. To see this, compare again a               
motor system to a Casio keyboard. A keyboard may use different sequences of keys to play                
the same sequence of sound. Consider the sort of commands that some keyboards possess              
— or ​chunked commands ​— ​which, when pressed, play at once a whole soundtrack              
(​Figure #6​). These commands enable to execute not just one note but a sequence of notes                
at once​. Chunked commands are also not structured, just like the main white and black               
 
 keys; so in this sense, they are structurally simple in the same way as elementary               
commands. They differ from elementary commands as their content is complex complex,            
and therefore, the instructions they issue are complex. 
 
 
Figure #6:​ Elementary but chunked commands 
 
Now, as illustrated in ​Figure #7​, we might imagine different keyboards with a             
different repertoire of commands. For example, Keyboard #1 only possesses the main keys             
as commands. Keyboard #2 possesses a chunked command ​— ​a green button ​— that plays               
a sequence of two notes in addition to the main keys. Keyboard #3 possesses the main keys                 
and a blue button, that plays a sequence of three notes. Keyboard #4 possesses the main                
keys and a red button that plays at once the whole sequence of four notes. 
 
 
Figure #7:​ Configurations of commands  
 
The execution of these four different configurations of commands brings about the same             
sequence of sounds.  
The motor system and motor commands are similar to a Casio keyboard and its              
configurations in some key respects. Similar to how Casio keyboards might differ in the set               
 
 of their chunked commands, different motor systems might differ in their set of elementary              
commands. That might happen, for example, if two motor systems have undergone            
different “​chunking processes.​” A chunking process is the process through which complex            
operations become elementary for a system. A variety of experimental studies have            
demonstrated the existence of ​motor ​chunking ​(Newell 1990: 8​–​10; Sakai & Kitaguchi &             
Hikosaka 2003; Verwey 2010; Verwey and al. 2011:407; Fridland 2019; Pavese 2019).            
Motor chunking is believed to occur as a result of practice and to make the execution of a                  
task more efficient as a result. This efficiency can be explained by modeling the result of                
motor chunking in terms that are analogous to what I have called a “chunked command”               
on a keyboard. Just like Keyboard #2 has a specialized instruction (the green button) to               
execute a sequence of two notes, the motor system can chunk a sequence of commands to                
develop a specialized new elementary command that can execute that whole sequence at             
once. Because of chunking, the set of elementary operations of a motor system can vary               6
through time as practice occurs and can vary across motor systems at the same time.  
Since motor systems can have different elementary commands, they can differ in            
their abilities in ways that are neither conceptual nor merely perceptual. To see this,              
consider again the Casio keyboard. ​Recall that the four keyboards differ in their             
elementary commands. This difference in their elementary commands corresponds to a           
difference in the keyboards’ abilities. For example, Keyboard #1 can play a sequence of              
two sounds only by pressing two keys; by contrast, Keyboard #2 can execute the same               
sequence at once, by pressing a single command. Hence, Keyboard #2 and Keyboard #1              
differ in their elementary abilities. The abilities to execute different elementary commands            
are neither merely perceptual nor merely conceptual abilities. Imagine that we endow a             7
Casio keyboard with a sub-system ​— system Perc — that tracks the frequencies of the               
sounds in the environment with an oscilloscope showing the result of the tracking, like a               
sound frequency meter (​Figure #8​). 
 
6 An important difference between the motor system and a normal Casio keyboard is that once a motor system has                    
chunked a sequence [A][B][C] into [A, B, C], the motor system will not be able to execute the very same sequence                     
by executing the commands [A][B][C] sequentially. By contrast, Keyboard #2, for instance, can still play the first                 
two notes by using instead of the green button the two original black and white keys.  
7 There are two distinguishable senses in which the Casio keyboard’s ability to execute a command has a                  
mind-to-world direction of fit. In the first sense, it has a mind-to-world direction of fit because executing a primitive                   
command results in a change in the world. In the second sense, it has a mind-to-world direction of fit because it                     
enables the keyboard to represent a note with a single command, and a command has a mind-to-world direction of                   
fit.  
 
  
Figure # 8:​ Sound frequency meter  
 
System Perc would be akin to our perceptual system because the display would represent              
sounds in the environment in accordance with the keyboard’s tracking abilities, which are             
frequencies tracking. Or imagine we equipped the Casio keyboards with an additional            
sub-system ​— system Conc — that classifies sounds in the environment according to their              
pitch or their rhythm by mapping them into the label of the corresponding musical note, in                
a way analogous to ​a note recognition device or app​. Imagine the system is sophisticated               
enough that it can draw simple inferences ​— e.g., ​from the fact that the note is a C to its                    
not being a D. ​System Conc would be akin to our conceptual system because it would                
represent in accordance with the keyboard’s classificatory, reasoning, and thinking abilities           
(e.g., which sounds it can not only tell apart but also label and reason about).  
The main keyboard’s system, including both black and white keys and chunked            
commands, is distinct from both system Perc and system Conc, because the main             
keyboard’s abilities include neither system Conc’s conceptual abilities nor system Perc’s           
its perceptual abilities and differ from both in their direction of fit (Platts 1979:257;              
Anscombe 1957:56)​. Conceptual abilities are abilities to conceive — i.e., to be in a certain               
conceptual state, to output conceptual representations; perceptual abilities are abilities to           
perceive — i.e., to output perceptual representations. Practical abilities are abilities to            
execute instructions. In conclusion, the different configurations of commands in the 4            
keyboards above stand for the same sequence of sounds but in different ​ways that depend               
on the elementary practical abilities of the relevant keyboards.  
A configuration on a Casio keyboard is a metaphor for practical representation. We             
can think of each key, and each configuration of keys, to ​stand for (and in this sense, ​to                  
represent​) the note, or the sequence of notes, that pressing that key will result in playing.                
In this sense, those different configurations of keys stand for the same sequence of sounds               
in different ​practical ways, in terms of different primitive commands and abilities to             
execute those commands. ​In the same way, different motor systems that have undergone              8
8 It is worth noting that on a view on which representation requires agency, of the sort defended by Burge (2010:                     
chapters 8​–​9), there is no sense in which a Casio keyboard can represent perceptually, conceptually, let alone                 
 
 different chunking processes will differ in their primitive commands and in their practical             
abilities.  
 
 
 
Figure #9:​ Different Practical Representations 
 
Similar to configurations of keys on different keyboards, motor systems that had            
undergone different practice and therefore have different chunking processes, might differ           
in their set of primitive abilities. Because the set of a system’s primitives can vary through                
time, a motor system might prescribe the same task in different ways at different times.               
They will break down the task into a different set of elementary commands depending on               
the set of their primitive abilities at that time.  
In conclusion, the analogy between the motor system and the Casio keyboard is             
instructive for it highlights in what ways motor commands are functions of the practical              
abilities of their system. Predictably the analogy is not perfect. Let me highlight two              
important differences. First, motor commands (though not merely perceptual) are          
perceptual because they are the output of perceptual processes and take into account the              
environment’s features where the task takes place. Hence, if motor commands count as             
representations, they must be ​hybrid representations, both perceptual and practical.          
Second, although configurations on a keyboard are played one after the other, they are an               
important sense ​static​: they “stay there” waiting to be executed. By contrast, motor             
representations are ​dynamic because they are issued in furtherance of the task goal as the               
task unfolds (cf. Rescorla 2018).  
practically. By contrast, on a more permissive notion of representation, broadly teleosemantic, on which any system                
that has been assigned a certain function is in position to represent in virtue of being assigned that function (Dretske                    
1986; Neander 2017), a configuration on a Casio keyboard could be a representation. In this case, the relevant                  
function is the function to activate the switches to generate the production of the sounds. Here, I wish not to take a                      
stance on this thorny issue.  
 
 A final difference between configurations on a Casio keyboard and motor           
commands is the following. The status of Casio configurations as representations is            
questionable, because it is not clear that we ​need ​to think of those configurations as               
representations. When explaining the functioning of the keyboard, representation-talk is          
dispensable. By contrast, as I argue in the next section, it is explanatorily helpful to think                
of motor commands, as well as other motoric prescriptive representations to be discussed             
later, as ​bona fide​ representations.  
 
3 Why posit practical representation? 
Cognitive scientists definitely speak of motor instructions as if they are ​bona fide             
representations ​(e.g., Winograd 1975; Tulving 1985, Anderson 1982; ​Stevens 2005;          
Knowlton & Foerde 2008; Tankus & Fried 2012​). More generally, it is common to find               
cognitive scientists to talk as if procedural systems such as the motor system are              
representation-based. For example, Tulving tells us that “The representation ​of acquired           
information in the procedural system is prescriptive rather than descriptive.” (​Tulving            
1985: 387-8). ​Many philosophers follow motor scientists in allowing these sorts of             
unconscious that are not necessarily available at the personal level (e.g., Sinigaglia &             
Butterfill 2013; Mylopolous & Pacherie 2016; Rescorla 2016; Pavese 2017; Levy 2017;            
Fridland 2017).  
There are, indeed, excellent empirical reasons for thinking that the procedural           
system encodes information about the task to be performed. However, as Dretske (1988)             
teaches us, carrying information and representing are a different matter. For example, tree             
rings’ carry information about the tree’s age, without representing it. So, why think that we               
are dealing with ​bona fide ​representations when we are dealing with practical            
representations? Following a recent argument by Ramsey (2007:2.2), some might argue           9
that talk of practical representation is ​dispensable​. ​Consider a rifle that responds to a              10
finger movement by discharging a bullet from the muzzle. There is an internal mechanism              
9 ​As many scholars have emphasized, there are many “intra-theoretical” reasons for positing motor representations.               
As Sinigaglia & Butterfill (2014:122​–​13) and Pavese (2017) notice, the ​functional role of motor representations               
within computational models of motor behavior seems to be that of a representation: motor representations are the                 
outputs of a computational process, motor planning. Motor planning takes a representation as input (an intention)                
and returns a representation as output. Moreover, they are inputs to monitoring, which are internal predictive models                 
that estimate likely effects of actions (Wolpert 1996; Miall & Wolpert 2005). And, as Fodor would put it, no                   
computation without representation! This argument for positing representation, however, requires granting a lot: that              
certain computational models of motor behavior are correct, for example, in describing the motor system as planning                 
an action or monitoring it. The “intentionality” of this way of speaking already presupposes that it makes sense to                   
posit representations for the motor system. But this is exactly what is at stake.  
10 I am grateful to Ganson for discussion here. 
 
 whereby the movement of the trigger causes the movement of the firing pin, which causes               
the ignition of the primer in the cartridge, which causes the explosion of the propellant,               
which causes the bullet to travel down the barrel and exit at speed. This explanation of the                 
behavior of the rifle does not need to appeal to ​any ​representation: the description of the                
mechanism of the trigger will satisfactorily explain the rifle’s firing. Motor commands are             
not ​that ​different from the command issued when pulling the trigger. If so, why think of                
motor commands in representational terms and of the motor system as a representational             
system? Doing so might seem explanatorily idle. Call this the ​objection from the rifle​. 
Skepticism about positing practical and procedural representation is often voiced          
even by those philosophers who are convinced that representation-talk in cognitive science            
can sometimes be explanatorily helpful. Because what is at stake here is whether practical              
representation is real, as opposed to whether ​any representation is real, I will assume that               
representation-talk is explanatorily helpful ​at least in some cases​. In particular, I will             
assume that there are personal-level representations such as intentions and beliefs. Then,            
the question becomes: Why think that, when explaining motor behavior, we need to posit              
motor and procedural representation in addition to intentions, beliefs, and desires? 
In order to show that positing practical representation is not explanatorily idle, what             
has to be shown is that the constitutive aspect of representation ​— what distinguishes              
representation from information carrying, for example ​— ​enters essentially in our           
explanations of motor behavior. What is distinctive of representation is that it is             
normatively assessable as accurate or inaccurate: a representation can ​misrepresent ​(e.g.,           
Brentano 1874; Dretske 1986; Neander 2017). What has to be shown is that this normative               
aspect of representation is explanatorily helpful when it comes to explaining motor            
behavior. 
The normative aspect of representation is helpfully modeled by the so-called           
“content-target” model ​(Cumming 1996; Greenberg 2019). ​According to this model, a           
representation ​aims at its target ​— ​a representation that is meant as a representation of               
Obama ​aims at Obama ​— and ​expresses/denotes its content ​— ​the set of properties that the                
representation ascribes to Obama (​Figure #10​). For example, the picture of Obama aims at              
Obama if that is what the painter wanted to paint; and the picture expresses certain               
properties if it portrays Obama as having certain properties. A representation is ​correct             
when the content matches its target — if the properties expressed match those that Obama               
actually has — and incorrect otherwise: 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure #10:​ The Content-Target Model of Representation 
 
Appealing to the content-target model of representation, we can reframe the question of             
whether positing practical representation is explanatorily helpful in the following terms.           
Motor commands (and motor schemas) are genuine representations if they can be            
explanatorily helpful to appeal to the content-target model of representation with respect to             
motor commands and, in particular, to talk as if motor commands misrepresented their             
target. 
At first, one might reasonably wonder whether talk of misrepresentation applies to            
motor commands. After all, imperatives do not represent accurately or not, they are not              
true or false. However, note that there is an important sense in which motor commands ​can                
be correct or incorrect: a motor command can prescribe the execution of a certain task               
correctly or incorrectly ​with respect to the original intention of the agent​. The standards of               
correctness here are imposed by the intentions of the agent, which fix the target task to be                 
executed. 
Appealing to the agent’s intention in fixing the target of the motor commands             
enables the extension of this three parts model to the notion of practical representation. On               
this model, a practical representation (say, a motor command) ​aims at its target ​(the task               
that the agentintend to execute) and ​expresses its content​(the set of properties that the              
command prescribes the task to be executed to have). Thus, if an agent wants to dance,                
ceteris paribus​, the motor system will produce a motor representation that aims at the task               
of dancing and represents it as having certain properties. The representation is correct if it               
 
 represents the task that the agent wanted to execute — i.e., when its content matches the                
target (​Figure # 11​): 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure #11: ​The Content-Target Model of Practical Representation 
 
When the motor commands incorrectly prescribes the target task that the agent intends to              
execute, the three part model licenses us to say that the motor command misrepresents that               
task.  
So, it does make sense to talk of misrepresentation for motor commands. But is it               
ever explanatorily helpful to talk of ​mis​representation when it comes to motor behavior?             
As a case study, consider ​Ideomotor Apraxia ​(henceforth, “IA”)(​Geschwind 1965a,          
1965b; Heilman & Rothi 1993; Macauley & Handley 2005; Jeannerod 2006; Wheaton &             
Hallett 2007; ​Krakauer & Shadmehr 2007; ​Gross & Grossman 2008; Vanbellingen &            
Bohlhalter 2011; ​Sathian et al. 2011​). ​IA​is a motor deficit that is not due to paralysis,                
muscle weakness, or even sensory loss. ​Rather, it is a deficit in the ability to ​plan ​motor                 11
actions in the following sense. Patients affected by it are perfectly able to explain how a                
certain task is performed. However, strikingly, they are unable to imagine, act out, or              
pantomime the correspondent movement on demand, such as “pretend to brush your teeth”             
11 ​Neuroscientists routinely describe IA as a defect in “motor programming” or in “selecting the right motor 
program.” Cf. ​Macauley & Handley (2005:30​–​31). Jeannerod (2006:12) describes the phenomenon as the 
consequence of a “disruption of the normal mechanisms for action representations​.” 
 
 or “pucker as though you bit into a sour lemon” or “pick up a phone”. Often their                 
pantomime reflects improper orientation of their limbs and impaired spatio-temporal          
organization. Remarkably, however, they are often able to perform an action when            
environmentally cued. For example, while they may not be able to pick up the phone when                
asked to do so, they might be able to perform the action when the phone rings. Although,                 
for a while, ​IA ​has been thought to be due to a deficit in semantic knowledge, recent                 
findings suggest otherwise. Some patients affected by ​IA ​might perform well when it             
comes to correctly identifying the correct hand postures in observational tasks or to             
verbally describing how to use the tool and to position their limb ​(Hayakawa et al. ​2015​).                
This suggests that the deficit is not due to defective semantic understanding of what              
subjects are asked to do. 
IA ​is an example of dissociation between the declarative knowledge system and the             
procedural system. But it also provides an exemplary illustration of the explanatory            
advantage of practical representation. For how do we go about explaining ​IA​? Talking             
simply about the motor system not functioning, as when the rifle fails to shoot despite the                
shooter wanting it to, would not distinguish apraxic patients from subjects who simply lack              
the ability to perform the relevant motor task. As mentioned, many apraxic patients ​can              
perform the relevant tasks at least in some circumstances. Rather, what is distinctive to the               
IA ​patients is that the motor system is not “hooked up” to the high-level personal               
representation of the task command ​in the right way ​and the motor behavior ends up               
diverging from the request that the agent intends to execute. Note that it is not simply that                 
the intention does not succeed at causing the motor behavior. The motor behavior ​is ​issued               
in this case. Moreover, the motor behavior issued by apraxic subjects is not random, as if it                 
resulted from ​some ​sort of planning. What is distinctive about ​IA ​is that there seems to be                 
a mismatch between what the task the agent represents as being required and the task that                
is prescribed by the motor system: the task that the motor commands prescribe does not               
match the task that the agent intended to perform upon request. This description of apraxic               
behavior essentially appeals to the ​content ​of the motor commands and essentially appeals             
to the fact that the target of the motor representation (in this case, what task the agent is                  
asked to perform) does not match the actual content of the motor representation.  
Hence, talk of practical representation gains us the most natural and empirically            
supported psychological description of what goes distinctively wrong in patients with           
Ideomotor Apraxia ​and in other similar dissociations between one’s personal level           
 
 intentions and one’s motor system. ​The ​objection from the rifle ​fails to establish that              12
practical representation is explanatorily dispensable. Although the behavior of the motor           
system, like the mechanism of the rifle, might be described without representation talk, as              
soon as we aim at describing how the motor system interacts with the agent’s intentions               
and at explaining in what ways the motor system fulfills them, we are led back to talking                 
as if the motor system correctly represented or misrepresented those intentions — i.e., we              
are back to exploiting the normative dimension of representation.  
  
 
4. From Practical Representations to Practical Concepts: The Hierarchy of Practical           
Representation 
In the literature on action and know-how, practical modes of presentation are discussed as              
pertaining in the first instance to ​conceptual representation​. Peacocke (1986: 49–50) talks            
of “action-based ways of thinking.” Stanley & Williamson (2001) draw an analogy            
between practical modes of presentation and ​first personal modes of presentation (Perry            
1993). Stanley (2011: 98–110) identifies practical modes of presentations with practical           
ways of ​thinking​. Bengson & Moffett (2007) and ​Mylopoulos & Pacherie (2016) ​talk of              
“ability-entailing concepts.” Pavese (2015a) talks of “practical concepts.” Pavese (2015b)          
talks about practical senses and Fregean senses are typically assimilated to concepts.  
Prima facie​, the discussion in this chapter might seem to substantially diverge from             
these discussions of practical modes of presentation in that practical modes of presentation             
have been defined by contrast to conceptual modes of presentation and ways of thinking.              
Despite this apparent discrepancy, the current discussion is compatible with and a            
desirable development of those earlier views of practical modes of presentation.  
First, some practical representations are, like perceptual representations,        
non-conceptual: for example, motor commands are non-conceptual practical        
representations. But the present proposal is compatible with there being hybrid           
representations, for it is compatible with there being representations that represent both as             
a function of practical abilities and as a function of conceptual and perceptual abilities.              
So, it is compatible with there being practical representations that are also conceptual or              
even both conceptual and perceptual. 
 Now, consider the sort of motoric representations involved in the translation of            
intentions into motor commands: motor schemas (Bernstein 1967; Schmidt 1975, 2003;           
12 ​Another example of the explanatorily helpfulness of practical representations is the case of motor adaptations, 
(e.g. Mazzoni& Krakauer 2006), where the motor system adapts to execute a strategy that does not necessarily align 
with the agent intentions. Cf. also Gallistel (1999). See Pavese (2020b) for more discussion.  
 
 Arbib 1985; Jeannerod 1997). Motor schemas are less context-specific and more           
enduring motor representations that mediate between intentions and motor commands.          
For example, Arbib (1985) talks of motor schemas as a predetermined set of commands,              
often characterized as a “control program.” This suggests that like motor commands,            
motor schemas are also prescriptive representations, only more general and less           
context-dependent. They are supposed to be revisable through trial and error and able to              
store information about the invariant aspects of an action (Arbib 1981; Jeannerod 1997:             
51​–​5). There seems to be some evidence for thinking that motor schemas can be refined               
through focus and mental rehearsing of the motor task, which would suggest that they are               
accessible to the personal level (e.g., Feltz & Landers 1983; ​Sherwood & Lee 2003​).  
Motor schemas are better candidates for being a conceptual, albeit practical, sort            
of representation. For they are akin to “object schemas” that some identify with             
conceptual representation of objects. They interface between motor commands and the           
semantic representations of an action, in a way similar to how, in the theory of perceptual                
representations, ​observational concepts are supposed to mediate between percepts and          
non-perceptual conceptual representations (Weiskopf 2015; Pavese 2020b). These        13
representations can be modeled by Pavese’s (2015) practical senses. Like a program, a             
practical sense breaks down a task into a different sequence of instructions, depending on              
the system’s most basic practical abilities. For example, if multiplying is an elementary             
operation for the system, it does not break down the task of multiplying into subtasks.               
But if multiplying is not elementary, then it might break it into subtasks that include               
adding. So, a practical sense can play the role of interfacing between semantic concepts              
of a task and a motor command by mapping the semantic representation of a task into                
different motor commands, depending on the basic abilities of the system. In this sense              
motor schemas can be modeled as practical senses.  
 
 
 
 
 
Non-Practical Concept Non-Observational Concept 
13 ​With respect to these sorts of motor schemas, also Pacherie (2006) talks of “executable concepts”, that one can 
possess only by virtue of possessing the lower level-motor representation. 
 
 Motor Schema (or practical    
concept) 
Observational Concept 
Motor command Percept  
   Figure # 12:​ The Hierarchy of Practical Representation 
 
The conceptual nature of motor schemas is debatable. Whether or not motor            
schemas are best thought of as conceptual sort of representations, practical concepts            
mediating between semantic representations of a task and motor representations such as            
motor commands might nonetheless be needed, in order to overcome some puzzles that             
arise when understanding the relation between intentions and motor representations (cf.           
Sinigaglia & Butterfill 2014; Mylopolous & Pacherie 2017) and in order to provide a              
complete explanation of ​Ideomotor Apraxia​. Indeed, the best current explanation of           
what goes on with ​Ideomotor Apraxia is that these subjects cannot think of the task               
practically, and because of that, are incapable of forming the correct motor            
representations (Pavese 2020b, manuscript).  14
 
5. Conclusions 
Intellectualists have first introduced the notion of a practical mode of presentation in the              
debate about know-how (Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011; Pavese 2015b, 2017).            
Earlier discussions of intellectualism have assumed that practical modes of presentation           
ought to be ​conceptual modes of presentation. In this chapter, I have presented a taxonomy               
of modes of presentation according to which modes of presentation can be conceptual,             
perceptual, practical, or a combination thereof (§2). The notion of practical representation            
has been illustrated with the case of motor commands and motor schemas in sensori-motor              
psychology and its distinctive practical dimension has been explained ​via the Casio            
keyboard metaphor (§3). Although the notion of a practical mode of presentation has faced              
a lot of criticisms (Schiffer 2004; Noe 2005; Glick 2011), it is perfectly intelligible, as it is                 
a matter of representing as a function of one’s practical abilities. Moreover, the notion of a                
practical mode of presentation is psychologically real because a variety of representations            
posited by cognitive scientists, when explaining motor skillful behavior, represent          
practically in the very same sense. In §4, I have reviewed some reasons for thinking that                
14 ​Pacherie (2006) makes a similar point about ideo-motor apraxia. Pavese (2020b) develops it and extends by 
looking at the most recent findings concerning ideo-motor apraxia.  
 
 the existence of practical representation is motivated not by mere reliance on the current              
scientific practice but by a more principled argument for the explanatorily helpfulness of             
this notion when it comes to describing the interplay of the motor system with the agent’s                
intentions. This picture is not meant to rule out the possibility of ​practical concepts — i.e.,                
concepts that one comes to possess by virtue of practically representing the world in a               
certain way, just like one comes to possess observational concepts in virtue of perceptually              
representing the world a certain way. In fact, a complete theory of know-how and skill               
might ultimately have to appeal to practical concepts (§5). 
If that is right, practical representation — whether conceptual or not — is not an                
unwelcome commitment that intellectualists about know-how face; it is a necessary posit            
for any theory of know-how and skills. 
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